




**Director of
Central
Intelligence**



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25X1

Contents

25X1

Special Analysis

8 USSR - Eastern Europe: *Impact of Soviet Succession* 6

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25X1

25X1

19 November 1982

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

The USSR and Eastern Europe, 1953-82

Maneuvering in Soviet Leadership	Events in Eastern Europe
1953	
Political struggle in wake of Stalin's death.	Pilsen riots in Czechoslovakia. Insurrection in East Berlin.
1954-55	
Contest between Malenkov and Khrushchev. Malenkov loses but collectivity persists. Policy disputes. Rapprochement with Yugoslavia.	Increasing autonomy. Erratic policies, some political shakeups, growing party factionalism in Poland and Hungary.
1956	
Division in Politburo. Khrushchev's anti-Stalin speech.	Growing diversity. Polish October; Gomulka takes over. Hungarian revolution.
1958-62	
Preoccupation with emerging Sino-Soviet dispute. Berlin crises. Berlin wall. Khrushchev maintains precarious supremacy.	Withdrawal of Soviet troops from Romania. Albania defects.
1962	
Khrushchev weakened by misadventure in Cuba.	Romanian opposition to Soviet campaign to strengthen CEMA and Warsaw Pact.
1964-68	
Khrushchev ouster (autumn, 1964). Muted succession maneuvering, policy uncertainty. Emergence of detente, reaction to <i>Ostpolitik</i> .	East European leaders unsettled at Khrushchev's removal. Attempted coup in Bulgaria.
1968	
Confused, initially divided reaction to Czech events, but then August invasion.	Prague Spring.
1969-early 1970s	
Brezhnev moves to consolidate power.	Major riots in Poland (1970), Gomulka ousted, Soviets do not interfere.
1970s	
Brezhnev clearly dominant. Detente flourishes. No major policy surprises.	Era of relative tranquillity. Contacts with West accelerate. Romania still disruptive.
1980-82	
Brezhnev's health fading . . . death.	Unrest in Poland. Increasingly serious economic problems throughout Eastern Europe.



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Special Analysis

⑧ USSR - EASTERN EUROPE: Impact of Soviet Succession

The urgency of East European problems and General Secretary Andropov's long experience with the region suggest it will be among the first areas where he places his stamp upon Soviet foreign policy. Andropov is likely to favor tight security controls, but he also recognizes the advantages of a flexible, case-by-case approach toward dissent. In the economic sphere, he probably will encourage some innovation.

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Most of Eastern Europe is in serious economic trouble, and prospects for improvement are bleak. None of the regimes enjoys the positive support of the public, and even the current level of limited acceptance seems to be declining along with living standards. In view of the advanced ages of their top leaders, some East European regimes are likely to encounter succession problems of their own fairly soon.

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Substantial forces in Eastern Europe among labor elements, students, intellectuals, party reformers, and nationalists seek political and economic change. Previous periods of succession in the USSR have had unsettling reverberations among these groups, culminating in the revolution in Hungary in 1956 and the Prague Spring of 1968.

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Economic Difficulties

The most urgent problem now facing the East European governments--and at least indirectly the Soviets as well--is what to do about the growing distress of their economies. Hungary is already engaged in economic reform. The other governments probably will want to follow a mixed approach, including some of the following elements:

--Continuing to try to muddle through, which would only postpone the day of reckoning.

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19 November 1982

25X1

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- Continuing to seek greater assistance from the USSR and greater resource sharing within CEMA, despite Soviet economic difficulties and the risk of weakening their own autonomy.
- Placing greater emphasis on economic austerity and draconian political programs, risking strikes and riots.
- Deciding on a thoroughgoing, market-oriented economic reform, which would provoke controversy, encourage party factionalism, and for a time be economically disruptive.
- Shifting their economies, if this eventually becomes possible, toward the West for trade and aid, risking greatly expanded Western influence. [redacted]

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Andropov's Response

Y) The new General Secretary has had extensive dealings with the East Europeans as Ambassador to Hungary (1954-57), party secretary overseeing relations with the Bloc (1957-67), and head of the KGB (1967-82). This experience, coupled with the urgency of East European problems, suggests he will quickly turn his attention to East European issues. [redacted]

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Andropov may encourage East European leaders to adopt more pragmatic, innovative approaches to economic problems. [redacted]
reforms, a [redacted]

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[redacted] Elsewhere, some conservative elements in the parties would resist departures from traditional practices, even if favored by Andropov, and some might seek to use changes to increase their country's autonomy. [redacted]

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19 November 1982

25X1

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The Soviets will continue to consider aid to Eastern Europe on a case-by-case basis. Andropov is likely to be heavily influenced by his awareness of the cost of such aid to the troubled Soviet economy. He probably will want to accelerate the integration of East European and Soviet planning, production, and investment activity and will favor caution in trading with the West.

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As head of the KGB and since becoming Party Secretary last spring, Andropov has moved resolutely to eliminate dissent, although with some tactical flexibility. He has supported Hungarian leader Kadar's policy of winning over dissidents and working with them.

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✓ Although Andropov has publicly endorsed the Brezhnev doctrine, the Czechoslovak and Polish experiences will have convinced him that strong and timely measures are preferable to allowing events to reach a point where intervention might be required. He will use the contacts he developed as KGB chief with East European security services to monitor closely the situation in each country and will see to it that incipient problems are dealt with swiftly.

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19 November 1982

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